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In the light of approaching European Union (EU) enlargement 1 labor migration issues have at-
tracted huge public attention, and due to intensive political pressure a transition period of up to
7 years for the free movement of labor from new member states was accepted. Similar transition
periods were introduced after the accession of southern countries, Greece in 1981, Portugal and
Spain in 1986, however in spite of income di⁄erentials the ￿ ows of immigrants from these new
members were quite small (Eurostat 2000; Boeri et al 2000; Kraus and Schwager 2000). In the
case of German uni￿cation, despite large income di⁄erentials migration has stabilised since 1994
at a rather low rate (Burda 1995; Hunt 2000). The current enlargement is unprecedented: income
di⁄erentials are large (from 30% in Lithuania, to 69% in Slovenia), there exist no previous free
migration record, eastern European countries have undertaken transition from socialist to market
economy and they represent quite heterogenous set of countries. Since large wage and income gaps
between these regions are likely to continue for decades, strong economic incentives to migrate will
also be present. However, it is also well known that international migration is hindered by high
transaction costs, limited absorptive capacities of the receiving countries￿labor markets and by
existing cultural and linguistical heterogeneity within Europe.
The attitudes towards immigration from CEECs remain controversial. The adoption of the
common currency within the EMU means that labour mobility could become an important source
of dampening negative impacts of idiosyncratic shocks. On the other hand, there exist political
concerns of the huge ￿ ows of immigrants from CEECs, which could destroy the western welfare
state. 2 It is not quite clear whether immigration implies net bene￿ts or costs for the economy
overall, however, it is obvious that the e⁄ects of CEECs citizens￿immigration on the EU labor
markets will depend ￿rst of all upon magnitude (and distribution) of immigration 3.
Will immigration from East be large after accession and / or increase substantially after in-
troduction of free movement of workers? This is a question I attempt to answer in this paper.
I use panel data to account for sources of heterogeneity and idiosyncrasity, explicitly control for
both receiving and sending countries speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects and attempt to use them for the extrap-
olations and, ￿nally, present also some re￿ ections on the legal introduction of free movement for
CEECs. Throughout the paper I de￿ne ten central and eastern European countries to include:
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia. Although Bulgaria and Romania are not within the 2004 accession countries due to
economic underdevelopment, they will join the Union later (perhaps in 2007). Malta and Cyprus
are not included, since both countries are small and their economic situation is signi￿cantly better
than the situation of the CEECs. I use migration experience from Greece, Portugal and Spain
to estimate the parameters of the migration function, since they provide a somewhat comparable
situation to eastern enlargement in terms of income di⁄erentials, population sizes and transition
1In May 2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
will join the EU.
2See Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) for analysis, Sinn (2000) for implications for welfare state, The Economist
(2004) for a discussion of potential immigration after EU enlargement.
3See, for instance, Borjas (1999) for the cost-bene￿t analysis of immigration, Ichino (1993) for theoretical review
of the e⁄ects of immigration.
2periods regarding free movement 4. Then I use the estimated parameters for extrapolation to the
CEECs. Such analysis is always complicated due to data scarcity and reliability problems, distinc-
tion between stocks and ￿ ows of migration and even absence of common de￿nition of migration.
Certain methodological problems are inevitable due to so-called double out of sample projections -
for ten countries that have not been included in the estimated sample and for the time period out-
side the estimation period. Moreover, studies that use country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects to account for
unexplained variation face a serious problem: it is unclear which country-speci￿c intercepts should
be used when predicting future migration for countries with no previous record of free migration.
Obviously, such "guesstimates" should be taken with caution. Nevertheless, this paper suggests
that the overall level of migration from the East within a decade after enlargement will amount
to around 1% of the EU15 population and the legal introduction of free movement of workers will
not increase immigration signi￿cantly, contrary to what one might expect.
Empirical studies that forecast future migration ￿ ows from the accession countries vary in the
range of variables they include and the speci￿cations remain rather ad hoc. Typically, in the ￿rst
step, the association between past migration ￿ ows from the countries other than CEECs and ex-
planatory variables is estimated, and in the second step, future migration ￿ ows are predicted based
on estimated results. In order to use the coe¢ cients obtained in the ￿rst step to predict future
migration ￿ ows from the CEECs existing studies assume that migration decisions will respond to
the same factors in the same way in the future for out of sample countries, i.e. assume equality
of slope coe¢ cients. Orlowski et al (2000) exploit a standard gravity model approach to estimate
potential migration ￿ ows from ten CEECs to the regions of Austria and report quite large re-
sults. Alecke et al (2001) consider single Spanish - German case and show that standard gravity
model consistently overestimates migration and that one should include sending and / or receiving
countries-speci￿c e⁄ects to account for many push and pull factors suggested by modern migration
theory. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) base their estimates on southern EU enlargement and
show that the largest emigration rates are expected for Romania, Bulgaria and Poland as and the
lowest rate for Slovenia, but the overall results are large. Hille and Straubhaar (2001) also exploit
southern EU enlargement for estimation and suggest potential migration from ten CEECs into
the EU to range between 270,000 and 790,000 citizens per annum. However, it is unclear how
these studies deal with countries-speci￿c intercepts. Fertig (2000) and Boeri et al (2000) exploit
di⁄erent approach. They analyze immigration from seventeen di⁄erent countries into Germany in
a time-series error correction framework. To solve the problem of sending countries ￿xed e⁄ects
for out of sample countries, these ￿xed e⁄ects are regressed in the second stage on time-invariant
distance and country development indicators. The estimated coe¢ cients are then used to assess
immigration ￿ ows from ten CEECs. Boeri et al (2000) estimate immigration ￿ ows of 300,000 -
400,000 persons from ten CEECs into the EU upon accession under free movement arrangement,
which will decline subsequently, amounting to the stock of 2.9-4.5 million persons by 2015 de-
pending upon the income convergence scenario. The largest migration is expected from Romania,
Bulgaria and Poland and the most highly a⁄ected countries are Germany and Austria. Fertig
4PPP GDP per capita in the CEECs is around 45% of the EU average; in the three southern countries it was
around 65% of EC average in 1981. Population sizes in both cases amount to around 20% of current EU member
states.
3(2000) ￿nds that under the free movement arrangement, immigration ￿ ows into Germany would
increase only by 5% and decline subsequently. A recent study by Sinn et al (2002) found much
bigger migration potential into Germany, estimating time-series vector error correction model. Fi-
nally, Dustmann (2003) uses data on migration from seventeen di⁄erent countries into Germany,
employs a variance-components model for estimation and shows that, depending upon the empir-
ical model speci￿cation and forecasting scenario used, one can get net immigration ￿ ows from ten
accession countries into Germany to range between 20,000 and 200,000 persons. All such studies
are subject to many problems and criticism. The main methodological problems are double out of
sample extrapolations and associated forecast errors, assumption that estimated parameters will
have the same relevance for new member states, strong assumptions about future development of
explanatory variables. Many studies impose additional restrictions, such as expressing country-
speci￿c intercepts as a combination of observable characteristics only, omitting lagged dependent
variable, or using a combination of all these. Moreover, EU enlargement and potential migration is
a perfect application of the Lucas critique. Some researchers try to overcome some of the problems,
for instance by including country-speci￿c e⁄ects, however it remains "more than crucial" how the
country-speci￿c e⁄ects are de￿ned and applied to the CEECs, which have no historical experience
of free migration (Straubhaar 2001). 5
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a simple theoretical model
for the migration decision. Empirical models and estimation results of the migration function are
presented in section 3, and extrapolations for CEECs and comparison of the results with existing
studies - in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The basic framework within which most models of migration are viewed is neoclassical migration
theory, in which migration decisions are based on considerations of the relative expected future
incomes adjusted for the costs of migrating (Harris and Todaro 1970). The individual migrates
if expected income (expected utility) in the host country is greater than the expected income in
the country of origin. Sjaastad (1962) views migration as an investment in human capital and
heterogeneity among individuals is emphasized. The model argues that, depending on their skill
levels, individuals calculate the present discounted value of expected returns on their human capital
and migration occurs if the returns, net of the discounted costs of movement (both material and
psychological), are larger in a destination country than in the country of origin. The objective




(yf(t) ￿ yh(t))e￿￿tdt ￿ c
where yf(t) and yh(t) denote foreign and domestic earnings at time t, c is the cost of migration
and ￿ is the discount rate. The optimal decision rule induces migration when V E(t) > 0:Ghatak
5Fertig and Schmidt (2001) argue that a convincing choice of the country-speci￿c intercepts for countries for which
no previous migration record exists is the principal conceptual challenge for the prediction - yet, this identi￿cation
problem has not been addressed formally in any of the previous papers on this topic.
4et al (1996) argue that liquidity constraints of individuals should be taken into account. People
who wish to migrate generally face liquidity / borrowing constraints and a marginal rise in home
country￿ s income might simply ease such constraints and raise the rate of migration. The network
approach (Massey 1993) incorporates migrant networks - sets of interpersonal, cultural or linguisti-
cal ties that connect migrants and non-migrants in the origin and destination countries. According
to this framework, migration may become a self-perpetuating process, because costs and risks of
migration are decreasing with the stock of migrants already living in the host country, leading to
higher net returns on mobility.
These arguments can be used to derive an estimable micro-founded model of the migration rate.
The model has two important features: it incorporates uncertainty into the migration decision and
postulates that migration decisions are based upon expectations of future economic developments
6. Suppose that the probability of migration of individual i (i=1,...,n) from the home country (h)
to the foreign country (f) in a given year depends on the di⁄erence in expected utility streams in
the two locations (di), minus the composite cost of migration (zi)7. The utility function is assumed
to be concave and, speci￿cally, given by u(y)=ln(y). Hence:
di = E ln(yf) ￿ E ln(yh) + zi (1)
Expanding Eln(yf) around E(yf) using a second-order Taylor series expansion gives:





Following Harris and Todaro (1970) by denoting E(y)=we, the real wage times the probability
of employment, aggregating over individuals and assuming that the cost of migration depends on
MSTt, the stock of previous emigrants at time t (network e⁄ect), one can derive the following
aggregate emigration rate (see Appendix):
Mt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ln(
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+(1 ￿ ￿)￿"1MSTt + (1 ￿ ￿)￿"2t + ￿￿Mt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿"0 (3)
The emigration rate, adjusted by the population of the home country, is a function of relative
wages and relative (un)employment rates in the host and home countries, the existing stock of
migrants, the lagged migration rate, and a time trend.
Due to severe data limitations or a problem of ￿nding proper quantitative measures empirical
work usually cannot take into account all socio-economic push and pull factors that a⁄ect migration,
such that tradition and networks, ethnic and political problems, cultural and linguistic barriers as
well as geographic proximity. Moreover, in the real data variables, especially institutional factors,
are often highly correlated leading to the problems of endogeneity. Some problems can be solved
6The small strand of theoretical literature use the option value theory of migration (Burda 1995). In these
models, if one can observe the state of foreign economies, if migration decision is postponable and if one expects
future income convergence (all these due to, say, joining an economic union with the foreign country) it is better to
wait and not to migrate.
7These costs include both material and psycological costs of migrating.
5by using ￿xed or random e⁄ects models, when for the former correlation between country-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ects and regressors is assumed, however, it remains ambigous how these ￿xed e⁄ects can
be used for out of sample projections. Next section suggests a solution.
3 Data, methodology and estimation results
In this section I present my own attempt to estimate a migration equation. Existent empirical
studies in spite of the large heterogeneity conclude that at least 3% of CEECs population will move
West and seem not to identify a substantial increase in the immigration after introduction of free
movement. I use the historical experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain, since in line with existing
studies I have to assume that accession countries will respond to the same factors in the same way
in the future, as well as assume homoscedasticity and no correlation across regions and time, thus,
choosing a heterogenous sample of sending countries could be more problematic. I choose panel
￿xed e⁄ects estimation technique on the basis of diagnostic tests and willing to account for country-
speci￿c time-invariant factors that in￿ uence migration. I try two models speci￿cations: ￿rst,
with receiving countries-speci￿c e⁄ects only, and, second, with interactions between sending and
receiving countries-speci￿c e⁄ects, modelling explicitly the di⁄erences in country-speci￿c intercepts
by time constant factors. I also hope that the latter procedure contributes to reducing the problem
of restricting the slope coe¢ cients to be equal across countries. I omit a lagged dependent variable,
since including it leads to inconsistent estimates in the ￿xed e⁄ects estimation (I use stock of
migrants instead). The results are within the lowest tail of distribution among other studies,
however they are subject to many statistical problems (see above), small number of observations
being one of them. 8
3.1 Data
The data used for estimation cover emigration from Greece, Portugal and Spain into the EU
countries over time period 1985-1997, as well as GDPs per capita in PPP, unemployment rates
(as de￿ned by the ILO) and populations in the Southern countries and in all EU member states.
The original T. Bauer￿ s dataset was augmented by geographical distance (distance between two
countries￿capitals) from the Bali Online distance calculator 9, a Human Development Index from
the United Nations (2002), annual percentage GDP growth, foreign direct investment (FDI) net
in￿ ows and total trade with the EU (exports plus imports) in current prices from the IMF Direction
of Trade Statistics database and Eurostat Yearbook (various issues). For the extrapolations, GDPs
per capita in PPP, unemployment rates and population in the CEECs as well as the EU in the year
2000 were taken from Eurostat Yearbook 2002 and World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators
8The non-logarithmic speci￿cation of dependent variable saves only 13 observations. Since the data is non-
existent before 1985 and there exist missing observations, one could use either a di⁄erent data set to check the
robustness of the results, or a selection model to deal with missing observations. Nevertheless, while realising the
problem, I follow, for instance, Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Alecke et al (2001) or Mitchell and Pain (2003) who
use small samples for their migration analysis.
9Except for Slovakia-Austria, where distance between Bratislava-Salzburg was calculated, and Estonia-Finland,
where distance between Tallinn-Turku was calculated (since the distance between the capitals in these cases is too
small to be representative).
6database. The stock of migrants from CEECs is extracted from Eurostat￿ s New Cronos database.
Finally, CEECs￿GDP growth scenarios are taken from Orlowski et al (2000), where they were
calculated according to endogenous growth theory for pessimistic scenario (low GDP growth) and
optimistic scenario (high GDP growth).
The dependent variable used in all the models is the net immigration rate - the ratio of the
yearly immigrant in￿ ows into the EU member states (change in stocks) to the population of sending
countries. 10 Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 shows
the mean stocks of immigrants from Greece, Spain and Portugal in the EU member states before
and after introduction of free movement.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max
GDP, receiving 95 19 55.4 150.3
GDP, sending 66 7 55.4 77.2
unempl., receiving 9 5 1.6 24.1
unempl., sending 11 7 4 24.1
stock of migrants 28308 66042 0 359556
population, receiving 24740 26486 393 81896
population, sending 19822 13681 9862 39270
distance 2099 696 501 3362
HDI 0.85 0.03 0.79 0.9
immigration rate 0.14 0.37 0.00005 2.59
log immigration rate -4.8 2.6 -9.9 0.9
log gdp ratio 0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.8
log unempl. ratio -0.2 0.8 -2.4 1.5
log stock of migrants 8.1 2.4 2.8 12.8
free movement 0.6 0.5 0 1
Notes: Sending countries: Spain, Portugal, Greece. Receiving countries: EU15. Period: 1986-1997. Final
number of observations: 169. GDP, rec. is PPP GDP per capita in the receiving countries (EU15=100), GDP, send.
is PPP GDP per capita in the sending countries (EU15=100), unempl, rec. and unempl, send. are unemployment
rates as de￿ned by ILO in receiving and sending countries, stock of migrants is number of immigrants from rele-
vant sending country residing in the receiving country, population, rec. and population, send. are population in
thousands, distance is geographical distance in km. between the capitals of sending and receiving countries, HDI is
Human Development Index, immigration rate is in￿ows of immigrants from sending to receiving countries, divided
by origin￿ s country￿ s population, gdp ratio is the ratio of GDP per capita of receiving country to sending country,
unempl. ratio is the ratio of unemployment rate of receiving country to sending country, free movement is dummy
which is equal to 1 after legal introduction of free movement for Greece, Spain and Portugal.
A ￿rst look at the descriptive statistics suggest that introduction of free movement of workers
did not contribute to the substantial increase in the immigration from Greece, Portugal and Spain;
the stock of Greeks in the other EU countries has even decreased after 1988. One of the possible
explanations could be that almost 3% of the population of the southern accession countries had
10Only immigration ￿ows after 1986 were considered in order to estimate the immigration after accession to the
EU, since data before accession for Greece is non-existent.
7Figure 1: Mean stock of immigrants from Greece, Spain and Portugal in the EU before and after intro-
duction of free movement. Source: T. Bauer￿ s dataset. Notes: the ￿gure should be treated with caution, since
there are missing observations in the data.
migrated into the EU upon the time of accession already, thus the stock of immigrants in the
EU was already close to its equilibrium value and introduction of free movement of workers could
not have a signi￿cant impact on migration patterns anymore. Econometric analysis below provide
some further insights.
3.2 Econometric models and empirical analysis
The theoretical model in Section 2 suggests that the emigration rate depends on relative incomes
and unemployment rates between two locations and migrant stocks in the country of destination.
This model can be extended to include other factors, such as distance, linguistical and cultural
similarities into the costs function, demographic variables or lagged dependent variable. Dust-
mann (2003) suggests the following generic empirical model for analysing immigration into a single
destination country:
mi;t = ￿i + X0
i;t￿i + ￿mi;t￿1 + ui;t (4)
where mi;t is (log of) aggregate migration rate from sending country i in year t (adjusted by
population of country i), ￿i captures all unobservable time-invariant aspects that are speci￿c to
country i, k-dimensional matrix X i;t denotes the observable time-varying characteristics of country
i at time t (relative to the destination), mi;t￿1 is the lagged migration rate, ui;t is the error term
re￿ ecting all unsystematic in￿ uences, and ￿i is vector of unknown parameters. Following other
studies, in order to make projections I restrict ￿i = ￿ 8i, meaning that I assume the e⁄ects of the
explanatory variables are the same across countries within the sample, and will be the same for out-
of-sample countries. I also omit lagged dependent variable, since including it leads to inconsistent
estimates (I use stock of migrants instead) 11. Contrary to the majority of studies, I attempt to
11Including lagged dependent variable leads to inconsistent estimates in present model speci￿cation. An alternative
could be to account for lagged migration rate and carry out dynamic panel GMM estimation with weak endogeneity
of some explanatory variables introduced by Arrelano and Bond.
8explicitly control for time-invariant both sending and receiving countries-speci￿c characteristics.
In a cross-country analysis unobserved country-speci￿c omitted variables result in biased and
inconsistent estimates 12. If, however, panel ￿xed e⁄ects estimation is used, standard time-invariant
explanatory variables, such as distance, drop out. In order to decide which model to use for ex-
trapolations, I test ￿rst for individual heterogeneity using the Breusch-Pagan test, which compares
pooled OLS to the random e⁄ects model, and reject the null of no heterogeneity. This leads to the
question whether unobserved country-speci￿c e⁄ects are correlated with the explanatory variables.
I use Hausman￿ s speci￿cation test to explore that and reject the null of zero correlation, thus
￿xed e⁄ects model is preferred to a random e⁄ects model. With small sample size I use the most
parsimonous model with three key explanatory variables: per capita income di⁄erentials, relative
unemployment rates and migrant stocks.
Following methodology in Matyas (1997, 1998) I control for receiving countries speci￿c e⁄ects
￿rst. I also include time dummies and dummy for the legal introduction of free movement of workers
as well as its interactions with explanatory variables to control for the e⁄ects of this policy. Time
dummies appear to be neither individually nor jointly signi￿cant, indicating that migration in￿ ows
are determined by other controls than time13. The free movement dummy and all the interactions
are also individually and jointly insigni￿cant. Thus the ￿nal empirical speci￿cation is as follows:
ln(Mijt) = ￿ + ￿1 ln(
GDPj
GDPi
)t + ￿2 ln(
Uj
Ui
)t + ￿3 ln(MSij)t + ￿4FM + ￿j + uijt (5)
where M ijt is immigration rate from origin country i into destination country j at time t,
GDPjt is per capita GDP at PPP in the country of destination at time t; GDPit is per capita
GDP at PPP in the country of origin at time t; U jt is the unemployment rate in the country of
destination at time t; U it is unemployment rate in the country of origin at time t; MSijt is stock
of migrants from country i in country j at time t; FM is a free movement dummy which is equal
to 1 after 1988 for Greece and after 1991 for Spain and Portugal, ￿j is time-invariant ￿xed e⁄ect of
the receiving country that captures such factors in￿ uencing migration decisions as availability of
local infrastructure, access to social security, amenities and climate in the EU countries etc., uijt
is a disturbance term and ￿;￿1;￿2;￿3 and ￿4 are parameters to be estimated. According to the
theory I expect ￿1 > 0;￿2 < 0;￿3 > 0;￿4 > 0:
For the extrapolations of potential migration from the CEECs, an explanation of both sending
and receiving country-speci￿c e⁄ects is needed. Both country-speci￿c e⁄ects capture all time-
invariant factors that may a⁄ect migration between them, such as distance, language similarities,
common culture and history or long-term di⁄erences in endowments across countries. To be able
to incorporate both countries speci￿c e⁄ects and to explicitly control for time-invariant factors I
use the following two-stages procedure: in the ￿rst step, I use interactions of sending and receiving
countries (country pairs) as dummies in the original regression, in the second step, I estimate
12Standard gravity models (Anderson (1979)) perform relatively well in terms of goodness of ￿t, however overesti-
mate the parameters by omitting country-speci￿c variables. For comparative purposes I have estimated the standard
gravity equation. The extrapolations based on this model were, indeed, very high. The results are available upon
request.
13Since FM dummy might capture the time e⁄ect I have estimated the regressions without FM dummy and
including time dummies only. The results haven￿ t change: time dummies were insigni￿cant again.
9auxiliary regression and regress estimated coe¢ cients of these countries dummies on a set of time-
invariant variables (or those that can be assumed not to change dramatically over time). Thus, I use
Chamberlain￿ s idea to model panel data ￿xed e⁄ects as a function of time invariant characteristics
(and the means of time variant variables). 14. By estimating these individual intercepts I also
hope to reduce possible misspeci￿cation from restricting the slope coe¢ cients to be equal across
countries. Thus, in the ￿rst step I include ￿xed e⁄ects for each pair of countries and estimate the
regression without a constant in order to use the coe¢ cients from all interactions in the second
step. Again, neither year dummies nor interactions with FM dummy appear to be signi￿cant. The
￿nal model is as follows:
ln(Mijt) = ￿1 ln(
GDPj
GDPi
)t + ￿2 ln(
Uj
Ui
)t + ￿3 ln(MSij)t + ￿4FM + ￿ij + uijt (6)
where all the variables are as described above and ￿ij are ￿xed e⁄ects for each pair of countries.
In the second step these ￿xed e⁄ects are explained explicitly willing to include them into the
forecasting scenario. Following Fertig (2000) and Boeri et al (2000) I use distance, a Human
Development Index and also augment this method by including population in the receiving country,
since, contrary to them, I use interactions of both sending and receiving countries and attempt to
control for the e⁄ects in both countries:
c ￿ij = ￿ + ￿1DISTij + ￿2HDIi + ￿3POPj + uij (7)
where DISTij is a geographical distance between the capitals of two countries, HDI i is the
Human Development Index of the sending country, which captures the development status of
di⁄erent sending countries, POPj is the population in the receiving country and is a proxy for
labour market￿ s absorptive capacity.
Given the above model speci￿cations, another empirical complication is the problem of en-
dogeneity. If one might assume that migration ￿ ows are relatively too small to induce reverse
causality (the impact of immigrants on wages is the focus of analysis of many labour economists
and is beyond the aim of this paper), however there might still exist confounding factors that
in￿ uence contemporaneously wages, unemployment rates and migration ￿ ows. For instance, neg-
ative demand shock may drive unempoyment up or wages down (or both) and, at the same time,
increase emigration. To (partly) get around this problem I use instrumental variables estimation
with lagged values of income, unemployment rates and migrant stocks as instruments. I assume
the following conditions hold:
Cov(Z;u) = 0 (8)
Cov(Z;Xk) 6= 0 (9)
where Z is l-dimensional vector of instruments, u - is the error term in structural equation and X
is n-dimensional vector of explanatory variables with k endogenous elements; identi￿cation requires
14See Chamberlain (1985) for theoretical analysis, Dickens and Katz (1987) for application to industry di⁄erentials
and Andrienko and Guriev (2003) for application to interregional mobility in Russia.
10l￿ n: 15 I test condition (9) in the ￿rst stage regressions and the instruments seem to be strong.
Besides, I can assume that since Z￿ s are predetermined, immigrant in￿ ows and confounding factors
in u only a⁄ect contemporaneous and future wages, unemployment rates and migrant stocks, and
thus condition (8) also holds16.
The results of these estimations are discussed in the next subsection.
3.3 Empirical results
Table 2 presents panel estimations results that take account of individual heterogeneity. As dis-
cussed above, speci￿cation tests favour neither pooled OLS, nor random e⁄ects model, thus my
preferred speci￿cation is ￿xed e⁄ects estimation, and the estimated coe¢ cients are elasticities.
When only receiving countries-speci￿c e⁄ects are controlled for (column (2)), all explanatory vari-
ables are signi￿cant and have the expected signs, except for relative unemployment rates: the
higher GDP per capita in the country of destination relative to the country of origin and the
larger are migrants networks, the larger is migration ￿ ow into that country. Positive coe¢ cient on
unemployment ratio is somewhat in contrast with neoclassical migration theory, however it may
re￿ ect liquidity constraints of individuals in the sending countries, i.e. the higher unemployment in
the sending countries, the fewer people work, the fewer can a⁄ord to migrate. When interactions
of both sending and receiving countries-speci￿c e⁄ects are used (column (3)), the signs do not
change. However, the coe¢ cients on relative GDP and unemployment rates become insigni￿cant,
which is unsurprising given the small number of observations relatively to regressors and collinear-
ity with country-speci￿c dummies. Migration in￿ ows respond stronger to income di⁄erentials and
unemployment rates when only receiving countries e⁄ects are included, however when sending
countries-speci￿c e⁄ects are added, networks become more important. Legal introduction of free
movement of workers does not seem to in￿ uence signi￿cantly the immigration ￿ ows into the EU.
Interestingly, coe¢ cient on FM dummy has negative sign in column (3), however, this may be due
to small variation in the data and multicollinearity. The dummy is statistically insigni￿cant in all
models speci￿cation used. 17. Excluding FM dummy from the regressions does not change the
estimated coe¢ cients substantially (not reported). Finally, IV estimations results with receiving
countries dummies are reported in column (4). Comparing to model in column (2), the coe¢ cients
did not change much and remained signi￿cant. However, this model may overestimate the true
value the exclusion restrictions assumption for IV does not hold, or the instrument may not be
valid if the shock is autoregressive. In both cases, assumption (8) will not hold. Therefore I prefer
not to use the IV estimations for projections. 18 Moreover, FM dummy may also be endogenous
(destination countries decide on proper policy regarding immigration regime conditional on the
magnitude of immigration) and any change in policy can lead to the change in underlying equation
15I also assume that Z￿ s are redundant in the primary migration equation. If Z￿ s have direct impact on dependent
variable, IV overestimates the true parameter values. Although this is debatable, I refer to the simple theoretical
model in section 2 (one may extend the model, however, and use lagged explanatory variables in the primary
regression also).
16However, if the residuals are autocorrelated, the instrument will be invalid.
17See Boeri et al (2002) for discussion.
18IV estimation for the model with countries pairs ￿xed e⁄ects delivers insigni￿cant estimates due again to
multicollinearity and is not reported here.
11relations (Lucas critique). But to the best of my knowledge there exist no study so far that would
try to instrument FM. In general, all estimates have the same sign and are broadly consistent with
the theoretical predictions. For the projections I use two ￿xed e⁄ects models due to the reasons
described above and call them Model 1 (column 2) and Model 2 (column 3) respectively, assuming
that adding more degrees of freedom would contribute to the signi￿cance of coe¢ cients in Model
2 while not changing the magnitudes considerably.19
Explanation of countries-speci￿c e⁄ects is presented in Table 3. The estimates show that the
larger the distance between countries the larger are countries speci￿c e⁄ects, and the bigger is
population in the country of destination and the higher sending country￿ s development status the
smaller is the weight of these countries speci￿c e⁄ects. I was able to explain 56% of variation in the
dependent variable and, of course, incomplete explanation of the countries speci￿c e⁄ects reduces
the forecasting power of the model even further20.
19I also run three "robustness checks" for each of the ￿xed e⁄ects models. To account for economic integration and
(possible) income convergence I add, ￿rst, annual GDP growth in the sending countries, then FDI in￿ows into the
sending countries and, ￿nally, total trade (exports plus imports) between sending countries and the EU instead of
FDI in￿ows. In general, the coe¢ cients on main explanatory variables do not change much. Moreover, these simple
preliminary results seem to indicate that economic integration in￿uence emigration negatively (also consistent with
the option value of waiting theory).
20In Fertig (2000) R2 was 0.44 and in Boeri et al (2000) R2 was 0.42.
12Table 2: Panel data regressions
Model 1 2 3 4
Random Receiving Countries IV with rec.
e⁄ects countries f.e. pairs f.e. countries
Dependent variable: log immigration rate
log gdp ratio 1.45 (1.96)** 2.55 (3.53)*** 1.11 (0.85) 3.18 (3.58)***
log unempl. ratio 0.59 (3.18)*** 0.81 (4.76)*** 0.04 (0.15) 0.69 (3.82)***
log stock of migr. 0.84 (8.97)*** 0.78 (9.85)*** 2.3 (5.09)*** 0.74 (7.98)***
free movement 0.01 (0.09) 0.07 (0.45) -0.16 (0.93) 0.17 (1.00)
constant -11.81 (-15.71)*** -11.17 (9.33)*** -11.34 (7.57)***
R-squared 0.82 0.87 0.98 0.87
Breusch-Pagan test: p-value=0.0004
Hausman test: p-value=0.0000
Notes: dependent variable is migration in￿ows adjusted by population of sending country. Receiving countries
￿xed e⁄ects and countries pairs ￿xed e⁄ects are not reported. Number of observations: 169. Heteroscedasticity
corrected t-values are presented in parentheses, **signi￿cant at 5%; ***signi￿cant at 1%. gdp ratio is the ratio of
PPP GDP per capita of receiving country to sending country; unempl. ratio is the ratio of unemployment rate of
receiving country to sending country; stock of migr. is stock of migrants from sending country in the respective
receiving country; free movement dummy is equal to 1 after legal introduction of free movement. See text for data
sources.
Table 3: Explanation of Country-Speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects
Coe¢ cient t-value
Dependent variable: countries pairs ￿xed e⁄ects
distance 0.002 9.09***
HDI, send. -24.15 4.42***
population, rec. -0.00007 14.61***
constant -5.06 1.08
R-squared: 0.56
Notes: dependent variable is country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects retrieved from the regression of migration ￿ows on
GDP ratio, unemployment ratio, stock of migrants and both sending and receiving countries ￿xed e⁄ects. Number of
observations: 246. t-values are heteroscedasticity corrected, ***signi￿cant at 1%. distance is geographical distance
between two countries; HDI,send. is Human Development Index of sending country; population,rec. is population
of receiving country. See text for data sources.
4 Extrapolations for CEECs
For the out of sample projections the coe¢ cients estimated above in Model 1 and Model 2 are
combined with the data on GDP per capita, unemployment rate and migrants stock for ten central
and eastern European countries21. The following assumptions were made for predictions:
￿ Annual GDP growth for CEEC10 was taken from Orlowski (2000) where it was calculated
21Data for the stock of immigrants from CEECs in Greece is of 1998, France ￿1999, Austria ￿1999.
13according to endogenous growth theory for two scenarios: a low growth (pessimistic) and a
high growth (optimistic). Using these growth rates I have calculated GDPs per capita for
ten CEECs until 2015;
￿ GDP in the EU is assumed to grow at conventional 2% rate (see, for instance, Boeri and
Br￿cker et al (2000));
￿ Population in both regions is assumed to remain unchanged (ibid);
￿ Year 2000 unemployment rates for both regions are assumed to remain unchanged (ibid);
￿ The level (stock) of migrants is assumed to stay constant due to two-ways migration (Boeri
and Br￿cker et al (2000), Hille and Straubhaar(2001));
￿ Free movement of workers is assumed to be introduced in 2011;
￿ Extrapolations are based on the coe¢ cients estimated in section 4;
￿ Knowing that Bulgaria and Romania will not join the Union in 2004, I still include these
two countries into the projections as if they would, to compare the results with the actual
accession countries.
Model 1 predicts immigration ￿ ows to the EU around 254 888 (pessimistic GDP growth sce-
nario) / 233 440 (optimistic GDP growth scenario) upon accession. Model 2 yields an increase
in the number of residents from CEEC10 at the time of accession to amount to 343 144 (pes-
simistic GDP growth scenario) / 330 244 (optimistic GDP growth scenario). In all speci￿cations
the majority of migrants are coming from Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, which is in line with
the other studies and expectations. One could expect the number of emigrants to be greater when
controlling for both regions ￿xed e⁄ects, the reason being that on average a bad economic situation
in accession countries would contribute to the willingness to migrate. While it is true on aggregate
level, the situation is reversed for Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania. The possible expla-
nations could include liquidity constraints for Bulgaria and Romania, data reliability (for instance,
unemployment rate reported for Romania in 2000 is 7%) or migration costs that outweigh the
bene￿ts from moving abroad. Overall, the results yield a ￿ ow rate around 0.3 million immigrants
upon accession, while current ￿ ows from CEECs to the EU are also around 0.3 million, mostly to
Germany.22 The majority of immigrants in absolute numbers would come to Germany, Austria,
Italy and the UK, broadly consistent with existing studies. Sweden may also be a⁄ected, which
can be expected given its social security system, low unemployment rate and minor geographical
distance to the accession countries. Thus, the in￿ ows of CEECs citizens upon accession would
constitute around 0.1% of the EU15 population. The simulated immigration rates will decline in
the future, and depending on the growth scenario and model speci￿cation, by 2014 will amount to
172 830 (pessimistic scenario) / 127 436 (optimistic scenario) if Model 1 is used for projections or
to 239 620 (pessimistic scenario) / 209 538 (optimistic scenario) if Model 2 is used.
22When using the model without FM dummy numbers increase to 0.5 mln immigrants if both sending and receiving
countries speci￿c e⁄ects are included.
14Legal introduction of free movement of workers in 2011 will not lead to substantial jump in the
number of immigrants. In all model speci￿cations used the free movement dummy was statistically
insigni￿cant. Interestingly, when controlling for both sending and receiving countries ￿xed e⁄ects
the model predicts a decline in immigration after free movement is introduced (however, this
should be taken with caution due to possible bias in Model 2). The results seem to indicate that if
income convergence is likely (due to, say, trade liberalisation, openness to foreign direct investment,
structural funds from the EU and remmittances back home), the migration from CEECs would be
modest, even after introduction of a free movement provision. When evaluating the expected costs
and bene￿ts of moving West it might be worth for a representative migrant to "wait and see",
where the option to postpone migration has a positive value if there is uncertainty about future
wage gaps. Figure 2 shows projected in￿ ows of immigrants from the CEECs after accession.
Figure 2: Projected annual in￿ ows of residents from CEECs into the EU.
Note: EU countries exclude Luxembourg and Ireland due to data scarcity.
Figure 3: Evolution of the stock of residents from CEECs in the EU.
Note: EU countries exclude Luxembourg and Ireland due to data scarcity.
Finally, evolution of stocks of immigrants from CEECs in the EU is presented in Figure 3. As
can be seen, Model 1 predicts that depending upon GDP growth scenario within a decade after
15Figure 4: Comparison with other studies: Stock of CEEC8 residents in Germany. Source: EBRD (2003)
and author￿ s modi￿cations. Notes: CEEC8 include eight accession countries without Cyprus and Malta. M1-Model
1, M2-Model 2. Results for pessimistic GDP growth scenario only are represented here. Dustmann 1, 2, 3 - stand
for Baseline 01, Economic 01 and Economic 04 scenarios in Dustmann (2003).
eastern enlargement around 3.5-4 mln. CEECs citizens will reside in the EU, which constitutes 3-4%
of the CEECs population and 1% of the EU population; and Model 2 suggests higher projections:
around 5 mln. CEECs citizens within a decade, which constitutes 5% of the CEECs population
and around 1.4 % of the EU population. Thus, under above-mentioned assumptions, immigration
of about 3.5-5 million people can be expected in a time period from 2004 to 2014. In any case this
corresponds to 1-1.4% of the population of the current EU member states. These ￿gures depend
on the development of income convergence, extrapolations assumptions and estimation technique
used.
Figure 5 compares my results with some other studies and Figure 6 - with two studies that
explicitly model country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. Projections presented here are among studies that
predict modest immigration and seem to be consistent with studies that model ￿xed e⁄ects.23
23EBRD (2003, 96) also concludes that eastern enlargement should not lead to mass migration to the EU, despite
large income di⁄erentials. The Economist (2004, 25) concludes that "recent academic simulations have predicted
that as many as 3 - 4million people will migrate from central to western Europe in the 25 years after enlargement,
about 1% of the present EU population".
16Figure 5: Comaprison with other studies (Models with explicit ￿xed e⁄ects): Stock of CEEC10 residents
in Germany. Source: author￿ s calculations. Notes: CEEC10 include eight accession countries plus Bulgaria and
Romania. M1 - Model 1, M2- Model 2. Results for pessimistic GDP growth scenario only are represented here.
5 Conclusions
By taking advantage of both time-series and cross-country variation in a panel dataset, this paper
estimates the likely magnitude of immigration from eight accession countries as well as Bulgaria
and Romania into the EU member states. I have estimated a migration function using the southern
enlargement experience and controlling for receiving and sending countries-speci￿c time-invariant
e⁄ects, as well as estimating these e⁄ects explicitly in the auxiliary regression in order to use
them for projections. It was found that, while current aggregate immigration ￿ ows from the ten
CEECs are around 0.3 million persons, the estimated results suggest 0.3 to 0.5 million persons
after enlargement depending on the model speci￿cation employed. Immigration will decline in
the future as convergence of incomes will occur and a cumulated migration of about 3.5-5 million
people can be expected in a time period from 2004 to 2014, which constitutes 3-5% of the CEECs
population and roughly 1% of the current EU member states￿population. In all model speci￿cations
used the majority of migrants is predicted to come from Romania, Poland and Bulgaria and
into Germany, Austria, Italy and the UK, and introduction of free movement will not increase
immigration signi￿cantly.
However, it should be kept in mind that such estimations depend upon assumptions made
and have many drawbacks. In addition to common for this sort of analysis problems of data
reliability, relevance of southern enlargement as a reference scenario, restriction of equal slope
coe¢ cients across countries, Lucas critique and endogeneity, coe¢ cients in Model 2 are very likely
to be imprecise because of multicollinearity and small variation in the data. The assumptions
for extrapolations are also restrictive, one could change some of these assumptions and check the
robustness of the results. The dynamic panel data analysis with lagged dependent variable using
Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator could also be carried out.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Simple model of migration
This appendix provides a simple estimable model with microfoundations, in which migration is
viewed as investment in human capital. The model draws on Hatton (1995), Hatton and Williamson
(1998), Clark et al (2002) and Mitchell and Pain (2003). The model explicitly incorporates un-
certainty into the migration decision and accounts for the formation of expectations about future
income streams based on past information. Suppose that the probability of migration of individ-
ual i (i=1,...,n) from the home country (h) to the foreign country (f) in a given year depends on
the di⁄erence in expected utility streams in the two locations, minus the costs of migration (zi).
Denote this di⁄erence by di :
di = EU(yf) ￿ EU(yh) + zi; (10)
where y is income. The utility function is assumed to be concave and, speci￿cally, given by
u(y)=ln(y). Hence:
di = E ln(yf) ￿ E ln(yh) + zi (11)
Expanding Eln(yf) around E(yf) using a second-order Taylor series expansion gives:





2(Eyf)2 = ln(Eyf) ￿
V ar(yf)
2(Eyf)2 (12)
20Assuming that all incomes are derived from employment and following Todaro (1969), denote
Ey=we, the real wage times the probability of employment, which is the function of employment
rate (or 1 minus the unemployment rate). Also, assume that the uncertainty in y is due to
the uncertain prospects about employment (e) rather than the wages (w). Then employment
probabilities can be characterised as following a binomial distribution with expected value e and
variance e(1-e). Hence:

















So expected incomes can be expressed as:
Eln(yf) = ln(wf) + ln(ef) +
1
2




Uncertainty about employment abroad represented by the variance term leads to a greater
weight on the employment rate than wages. Staying at home would typically involve less uncer-
tainty (if the individual has relatively secure employment). Hence, expected utility from income
at home can be written as:
Eln(yh) = ln(wh) +
3
2
￿ ln(eh);￿ < 1 (15)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (10) gives:
di = ln(wf) +
3
2
ln(ef) ￿ ln(wh) ￿
3
2
￿ ln(eh) + zi (16)
The decision to migrate depends not just on current utility but also on future values of the
stream of expected utility at home and abroad. To account for inter-temporal dimension, denote
the expectation at time t of the net present value (NPV) of the di⁄erence in expected utility
streams from (t+1) onwards by d￿
it:Then the NPV of moving today is d￿
it+dit. Thus the individual
probability of migrating at time t is:
Pr(mit = 1) = Pr(d￿
it + dit) > 0 \ dit > 0) (17)
Aggregating over all individuals, the aggregate emigration rate, Mt can be written as:
Mt = ￿(d￿
t + ￿dt) (18)
where ￿ measures the impact of the di⁄erence in utility streams on the aggregate migration rate
(the slope of the emigration function) and ￿ re￿ ects the extra weight given to current conditions,
given that potential migrants could choose to wait if dit < 0: This condition postulates that, even
though the NPV of migrating this year may be positive, it may be even higher next year. In this
case potential migrants have an option value of waiting. For simplicity reasons, assuming that
probability of individual i migrating at time t depends on d￿
it; rewrite (17) as:
Pr(mit = 1) = Pr(d￿
it > 0) (19)
21Then aggregate emigration rate is given by:
Mt = ￿d￿
t (20)
Now, assume that expectations about future utility are formed by a geometric series of past
values of dt, such that:
d￿




Applying Koyck transformation (transforming AR process into MA process) gives:
Mt = (1 ￿ ￿)dt + ￿Mt￿1 (21)
Assume that z; the mean of zi over all individuals, is determined by the stock of previous
emigrants (network e⁄ect) and by a time trend (to proxy for the fall in emigration costs):
zt = "0 + "1MSTt + "2t (22)
where MST is the stock of migrants from h at the beginning of t and t is deterministic linear
trend. From equations (16), (20), (21) and (22), the following representation of emigration rates
emerges:
Mt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ln(
wf
wh
)t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
3
2




+(1 ￿ ￿)￿"0 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿"1MSTt + (1 ￿ ￿)￿"2t + ￿￿Mt￿1
The migration rate is a function of relative wages and relative (un)employment rates in the host
and home countries, the existing stock of migrants, the lagged migration rate and a time trend.
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